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Most of the chapters in this volume were prepared for a conference in honor of 
Guillermo Calvo, organized by the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department 
and held at Fund headquarters in Washington, DC, on April 15–16, 
2004. At the editors’ request, a couple of chapters were specially prepared after 
the conference for inclusion in this volume. The Fund was a natural and gracious 
host since Guillermo had a distinguished affiliation with the Fund’s Research Department 
from 1987 to 1994. Under his intellectual leadership, the Research 
Department carried out path-breaking research on, among other issues, capital 
flows, debt maturity, and inflation stabilization. Guillermo also made important 
contributions to the internal discussion and formulation of Fund policies, particularly 
in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America. 
The conference brought together renowned academics and policy makers who 
have had the privilege of being associated with Guillermo throughout his illustrious 
career. Some of Guillermo’s former colleagues at Columbia University— 
where he began his academic career in the early 1970s—also gave fascinating 
behind-the-scenes accounts of Guillermo’s early professional blossoming. One 
such account, by Edmund Phelps, recent winner of the Nobel Prize in economic 
sciences, is included in this volume. 
Delivering the opening remarks, Agustin Carstens (at the time IMF Deputy 
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Managing Director) struck a theme that would resonate throughout the conference. 
In Carstens’s words, ‘‘Guillermo’s ability to reduce complex problems to its 
essential elements has taught us that complex models are for lesser minds—for 
those who cannot grasp the essential elements out of a given reality. In Guillermo’s 
hands, the chaos of reality has always yielded simple and illuminating models.’’ 
Indeed, in an era in which increasingly complicated paradigms have become 
the rule, Guillermo’s simple—but never simplistic—models are a constant 
reminder that intellectual elegance and policy relevance can indeed go hand in 
hand. 
A second theme that pervaded the conference was Guillermo’s crucial role in 
bringing Latin American policy issues to the forefront of the academic discussion. 
In fact, Guillermo is arguably the single most important person in bringing modern 
economics to bear on the problems of nations south of the Rio Bravo. He 
brought rigor, discipline, and intellectual clarity to the difficult task of illuminating 
some of the region’s most pressing economic problems. As a token of gratitude, 
numerous academics and policymakers crossed the Rio Bravo to be present 
at the conference. Among them was Roque Fernandez—former Argentine finance 
minister—who spoke on Guillermo’s contributions to recent Argentine economic 
policy and whose remarks are also part of this volume. 
This volume is divided into six parts. The first five parts cover many of the 
issues that have been dear to Guillermo’s heart over his thirty-year career: monetary 
and exchange rate policy, financial crises, debt, taxation, reform, growth, and 
transition. The last part sheds light on the mind behind the man. In one capacity 
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or another, all the chapters’ authors have been closely associated with Guillermo 
and have had the privilege of learning and benefiting from Guillermo’s seemingly 
infinite wisdom. 
Since some of Guillermo’s most influential contributions have been in monetary 
and exchange rate policy, it seems only appropriate for the volume to open with 
theoretical advances in this area. A perennial and important question in open 
economy macroeconomics is: should countries fix or float? In other words, should 
an open economy peg its currency against a strong world currency or should it let 
the currency float? The standard response, based on the Mundell-Fleming model, 
is that the optimal exchange rate regime should depend on the type of shock hitting 
the economy. If shocks are predominantly of real origin, flexible exchange 
rates are optimal as they allow a quicker adjustment of relative prices through 
changes in the nominal exchange rate. If shocks are predominantly monetary, 
however, then fixed (or predetermined) exchange rates are preferred because 
adjustments to the nominal money supply are automatically carried out by the 
central bank. As Guillermo has put it, this is a result that ‘‘every well-trained 
economist carries on the tip of her tongue.’’ The first two chapters in the book 
deal with challenges to this basic tenet. 
In chapter 1, Maurice Obstfeld takes issue with a recent finding by Michael 
Devereux and Charles Engel, which holds that even if an economy is hit by real 
shocks, fixed exchange rates may be preferable if the nominal prices of both 
exports and imports are preset in the domestic currency. The key behind the 
Devereux-Engel result is that, under such a pricing assumption, flexible rates 
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cease to be a useful tool to effect adjustments in relative prices. Obstfeld argues 
that a minor modification of the Devereux-Engel set up—adding nontradable 
goods to their model—restores the optimality of flexible exchange rates under 
real shocks, though for different reasons than those emphasized by the traditional 
Mundell-Fleming model. In Obstfeld’s set up, flexible exchange rates become optimal 
again because the nominal interest rate is freed as a monetary stabilization 
instrument. 
In chapter 2, Amartya Lahiri, Rajesh Singh, and Carlos Végh approach the same 
problem from a very different angle by departing altogether from the traditional 
Mundell-Fleming set up. Based on the idea that asset market imperfections are 
likely to be as—if not more—important than goods market frictions in developing 
countries, they present a model of flexible prices where some economic agents do 
not have access to capital markets (in other words, there is asset market segmentation). 
In such a world, the authors show that the Mundell-Fleming result is 
turned on its head: flexible rates become optimal if monetary shocks dominate, 
while fixed rates are preferable if real shocks dominate. The key to understanding 
these results is that asset market segmentation critically affects the standard adjustment 
mechanism that operates under pegged exchange rates as it does not allow 
some agents to adjust their nominal money balances. In contrast, adjustments 
in the nominal exchange rate hit all agents equally. The chapter’s punchline is 
thus that the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime should depend not only 
on the type of shock (real versus monetary), but also on the type of friction (goods 
market versus asset market). 
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In chapter 3, Leonardo Auernheimer goes back to basics and revisits some of 
the themes that Guillermo has focused on in many of his contributions: the relevance 
of the government budget constraint, the concern with levels versus rates 
of change, and the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument. The central question 
addressed in this chapter is the well-known (but controversial) fiscal theory 
of the price level. As Auernheimer points out, the literature on this topic is extensive, 
occasionally obscure, and not lacking in sound and fury (witness Willem 
Buiter’s claim that ‘‘the fiscal theory of the price level is fatally flawed’’). As 
though guided by Guillermo’s own invisible hand, Auernheimer sets up an extremely 
simple model and takes the reader on an illuminating journey into the fiscal 
theory of the price level (and some related issues), stressing some of its truths 
and debunking some of its myths. 
The second part of the book turns to practical and empirical aspects of monetary 
and exchange rate policy. In chapter 4, Frederic Mishkin notes that Guillermo 
has been rightly skeptical of the adoption of inflation targeting schemes in emerging 
markets. Guillermo has convincingly argued in various pieces that, given 
weak monetary and fiscal institutions, high degrees of dollarization, and financial 
vulnerability, the consequences of giving policy makers too much discretion could 
be disastrous. While taking Guillermo’s concerns seriously, Mishkin presents a 
strong case for inflation targeting in emerging markets provided that countries 
can find ways of dealing effectively with large exchange rate fluctuations. He 
illustrates his arguments by looking closely at the cases of Chile and Brazil. 
In chapter 5, Enrique Mendoza goes a step further and forcibly argues that, all 
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things considered, emerging market countries would be better off giving up their 
national currency altogether. In his view, while giving up the national currency 
would certainly not eliminate business cycle fluctuations or financial problems 
associated with loose fiscal policies, it would considerably reduce an emerging 
market’s vulnerability to abrupt changes in capital flows and enable it to freeride 
on some of the credibility already gained by the country issuing the hard 
currency. 
But how do countries without a national currency fare in practice? There is 
virtually no hard evidence. In chapter 6, Sebastian Edwards and Igal Magendzo take 
a novel approach to analyzing the inflation and growth performance of countries 
with no currency of their own. To this end, they address an important methodological 
problem: joining a common-currency area (or dollarizing) may itself be 
an endogenous decision that could be related to economic performance. Their innovative 
answer is to resort to a ‘‘treatment effects model’’ (a technique often used 
in the labor literature) that jointly estimates the probability of being a common 
currency country and macroeconomic performance equations. Their main finding 
is that countries with no currency of their own have had significantly lower inflation 
and enjoyed higher growth, but suffered from higher macroeconomic volatility. 
The jury is thus still out on the net benefits of giving up a national currency. 
Ever since the now (in)famous Mexican crisis of December 1994 (aptly referred 
to as ‘‘the first financial crisis of the twenty-first century’’), Guillermo’s research 
on financial crises has set the agenda for much of the academic work in this area. 
The three chapters in part III provide new insights into this critical topic. 
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In chapter 7, Andrés Velasco and Alejandro Neut show how, in a simple world 
with capital market imperfections (that cause borrowing to be collateralized), pessimism 
can lead to self-fulfilling crises. To understand the basic idea, suppose 
that, due to a sudden burst of pessimism, stock market prices are expected to fall. 
If investment is subject to collateral constraints, the fall in stock market prices 
reduces the value of firms and hence investment. But lower investment leads to 
smaller returns in the future which, in turn, reduce stock market prices, thus validating 
the initial pessimism. Hence, bouts of pessimism can be self-fulfilling 
(Keynes’ animal spirits?), a scary thought indeed. Velasco and Neut proceed to 
analyze policies that might make this possibility less likely, such as expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy, debt restructuring, and financial and legal reform. 
But in practice, once a crisis erupts, how does it spread out? And what determines 
the speed with which countries recover?  In chapter 8, Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen 
Reinhart tackle the first question, analyzing how financial turbulencein emerging 
countries can spread across borders. They conclude that a financial 
crisis will spread globally only if it affects some major financial center; otherwise, 
it spreads, at most, regionally. For example, during the Asian crisis, Japanese 
banks’ exposure to Thailand—and their subsequent curtailment of lending to 
other Asian countries—played a critical role in spreading the crisis. 
The second question is tackled by Padma Desai and Pritha Mitra in chapter 9. 
They find that export performance before a crisis appears to be a critical variable 
in predicting the speed of recovery. Through investor expectations, export performance 
explains most of the difference in postcrisis interest rate and exchange rate 
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movements. In contrast, the fiscal position and national savings do not seem to 
matter as much. This casts some serious doubts on the desirability of contractionary 
fiscal policies, typically advocated by the International Monetary Fund. 
Some of Guillermo’s most influential contributions have been in the area of 
debt, taxation, and reform. In joint work with Pablo Guidotti, Guillermo showed 
that, under certain conditions, unanticipated increases in government spending 
are optimally financed with unanticipated inflation, which, in the model, imposes 
no costs. But does unanticipated inflation really have few costs? In chapter 10— 
the opening chapter of part IV—Michael Kumhoff and Evan Tanner argue that 
the reason why policy makers avoid unanticipated levies on government debt 
(through outright default or sudden burst of high inflation) is that government 
debt plays a key role in financial intermediation. Hence, defaulting or inflating it 
away would be akin to a negative technological shock. To make an empirical case 
for this argument, they show that in developing countries (1) government domestic 
debt is now larger than external debt, and growing relative to external debt; (2) 
banks voluntarily hold a very large fraction of their assets in domestic government 
debt; and (3) a deep and stable government bond market is critical for further 
development of domestic financial markets. In this light, explicit or implicit 
defaults on government debt would have real costs that would need to be traded 
off against the benefits of lower distortionary taxation. 
As countries develop, they increasingly rely on (personal and capital) income 
taxes. But how feasible is it to rely on capital income taxation in an increasingly 
globalized economy? As globalization makes it easier for firms to either locate in 
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low-tax countries and/or shift operations across countries to avoid taxation, will 
there be a race to the bottom? In chapter 11, Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka build 
a political economy model to assess how feasible it is for governments to impose 
capital income taxes. They conclude that a race to the bottom will indeed take 
place and argue that available evidence for European countries bears this out. 
It is easy for theory to suggest this or that policy. But in practice implementation 
of different policies is fraught with difficulties. In particular, the IMF’s track 
record in helping developing countries achieve successful reforms is, at best, 
sions than developed ones? Clearly, as the authors note, the phenomenon of deep 
and prolonged recessions presents a challenge to standard macroeconomic theory 
by suggesting that the typical growth picture of economic fluctuations around an 
increasing trend does not quite apply to the developing world. By focusing on 
a large sample, the authors conclude that while countries fall into these growth 
crises for multiple reasons—including wars, export collapses, sudden stops, and 
political transitions—most of these variables do not help predict the episode’s duration. 
They do find, however, that a measure of the density of a country’s export 
base is significantly associated with lower crisis duration. 
The volume closes with three short chapters that provide a rare and fascinating 
behind-the-scenes look at Guillermo’s career and intellectual journey from his 
early days in Buenos Aires through his doctorate at Yale, his years at Columbia, 
and his tenure at the IMF’s Research Department, to his more recent and highly 
influential role as the Inter-American Development Bank’s Chief Economist. In 
chapter 16, Edmund Phelps (recent Nobel Prize winner in Economics and Guillermo’s 
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colleague at Columbia University for many years) first reminisces about the 
years at Columbia (where a macroeconomic ‘‘dream team’’ had assembled). In 
chapter 17, Roque Fernandez (former Central Bank President and Finance Minister 
in Argentina) reveals Guillermo’s advisory role at a critical juncture in 
Argentina’s recent economic history. Finally, in chapter 18, Enrique Mendoza conducts 
a probing interview with Guillermo, which offers an incisive and penetrating 
look into Guillermo’s intellectual evolution and his views about the major 
ideas that have shaped the profession, both academically and from a public policy 
point of view. 
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